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ABSTRACT
Since the inception of democracy in South Africa, the nation has been touted as an example of ra-
cial reconciliation and harmonious diversity. However, the xenophobic violence that has plagued the 
state since 2008 and resulted in hundreds of fatalities reveals deep and ongoing intergroup divides. De-
humanizing rhetoric around immigration is propagated by both elected officials and the media, and 
non-natives are frequently characterized as ‘parasitic’ and ‘criminal.’ In this paper I suggest that the xe-
nophobic violence observed in contemporary South Africa may be explained via a three-pronged anal-
ysis: the construction of an ‘exceptional’ South African social identity during the early years of demo-
cratic rule, the intergroup conflict instigated by job scarcity, and the mythologized scapegoating of 
migrant workers as an outgroup responsible for the lack of opportunity that persists despite majority rule.
Xenophobia in the ‘Rainbow Nation’: An Analysis 





South Africa has been touted as the ‘rainbow nation’ in recognition 
of its diverse population and the largely peaceful integration of its 
various ethnicities in 1994, when the country achieved democra-
cy. But despite the nation’s dismantling of the apartheid system, 
there remain deep schisms between subsections of the population. 
South Africa’s non-native population in particular has experienced 
widespread and frequently violent ostracism, predominantly at the 
hands of indigenous citizens.
Since 2008, hundreds of immigrants from African countries, as well 
as from east and southern Asia, have been killed in a combination 
of isolated incidents and organized raids1. In May 2015, non-na-
tives across the country were endangered by xenophobic riots that 
left seven dead and thousands more displaced 2. Only one individu-
al has thus far been convicted of murder in relation to these attacks. 
As xenophobic rhetoric gains momentum in countries across the 
world, theoretical frameworks from social psychology provide an 
analysis of the mechanisms that underlie violence towards immi-
grants in South Africa. In analyzing xenophobia in contemporary 
South Africa, I suggest a three-pronged approach; I interpret the 
phenomenon as the product of a combination of nationalist sen-
timent, intergroup conflict imposed by high unemployment rates, 
and the mythologized scapegoating of a subordinate outgroup. 
An analysis and contextualization of xenophobia in contemporary 
South Africa is vital to understanding the forces that underly the 
phenomenon, and consequently to the development of government 
policy and public education that might counteract it. 
1 https://www.groundup.org.za/article/do-immigrants-steal-jobs-south-africa-what-
data-tell-us/ retrieved on 9/12/20
2 https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/18/africa/south-africa-xenophobia-explainer/in-
dex.html retrieved on 12/11/2020 
SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND THE PITFALLS OF PATRIOTISM
One theory that serves to explain the roots of this intergroup con-
flict is Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel et al., 1971). 
In 1994, after decades of notoriety for its implementation of the 
segregational apartheid system, South Africa experienced a largely 
peaceful transition of power and became a functioning democracy, 
prompting praise from nations across the world. A quote by Nelson 
Mandela, a leader of the African National Congress and the first 
democratic president of South Africa, sums up the sentiment at the 
time: “Sometimes it falls upon a generation to be great. You can be 
that great generation. Let your greatness blossom.” Not only was 
South Africa the poster child of peaceful political transition and 
racial integration, but it also boasted Africa’s largest economy at 
the time. National pride and hope were high. 
Social Identity Theory posits that part of a person’s self-concept 
derives from membership in groups that are of importance to that 
person. Under this theory, an individual may feel that what happens 
to their group reflects on and influences them personally (Augous-
tinos & Walker, 1995). Individuals are motivated to “strive for a 
positive social identity,” and to belong to groups that are distinct 
from, as well as superior to, other groups. This desire for distinct 
and superior social identity was, for the majority of South Afri-
cans, fulfilled by identification with the newly defined “Rainbow 
Nation’’ or “New South Africa.” Not only was South Africa a rare 
example of a postcolonial state that underwent a transition of power 
without large-scale civil conflict; it was also economically superior 
to other nations on the continent at the time. This phenomenon was 
captured in a study undertaken by Møller (1998), which showed 
that in the aftermath of the first democratic elections, levels of hap-
piness and life satisfaction of formerly disenfranchised South Af-
ricans peaked, eliminating the ‘happiness deficit’ of black South 
1YURJ | Vol 2.1Spring 2021
Calcott | Social Psychology
1
Calcott: An Analysis of Intergroup Conflict in Contemporary South Africa
Published by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2021
Africans as compared to white citizens under apartheid.  
Social identity theory also serves to explain why black South Afri-
cans who engage in xenophobic violence identify themselves with 
their nation instead of their race. While in the majority of recent 
cases both aggressors and victims of xenophobic attacks are of 
black African origin, the attacker’s hold a primary identification 
as ‘South African,’ which enables them to see other black Africans 
as opponents. This may be due to the negative public image often 
associated with black Africans as “poor” or in need of aid, where-
as South Africa’s relative prosperity has enabled a superior social 
identity—tied to nationality—to persevere. Steenkamp (2009) ar-
gues for what has become known as the ‘isolation hypothesis’—that 
the isolation experienced during apartheid galvanized Afrophobia 
in contemporary South Africa. Steenkamp suggests that South Af-
ricans “do not see themselves as Africans” and they “perceive other 
African countries as war-torn zones,” making it difficult for black 
South Africans to incorporate other Africans into their social group. 
This phenomenon contributes to the ingrained sense of ‘otherness’ 
South Africans feel towards foreign immigrants from the continent, 
which heightens outgroup derogation. 
In her article “Locating Xenophobia: Debate, Discourse, and Ev-
eryday Experience in Cape Town, South Africa,” human geogra-
pher Belinda Dodson locates the construction of a new, “nonracial” 
sense of South African national identity after 1994 as the site of 
the creation of a new oppositional “other,” the foreigner or “non-
South African” (Murray 2003; Peberdy 2001, Reitzes 2002). This 
“other” is most clearly manifested in those foreign Africans who 
have immigrated to South Africa, described by Murray (2003:460) 
as “the ultimate strangers—the new helots—within the social land-
scape of South African cities.” Dodson and Murray point out that 
antiforeigner attitudes are understood as originating in black South 
Africans’ attainment of the full rights and privileges of citizen-
ship post-apartheid and their subsequent protection of those ben-
efits against the perceived threat of infringement or usurpation by 
non-nationals (Murray 2003; Nyamnjoh 2006). This stands in line 
with Social Identity Theory, as a key aspect of a functioning social 
identity is distinctiveness—difference from and superiority to—an 
outgroup. With the construction of the South African national iden-
tity, there was a requirement for distinctiveness from the non-native 
immigrant group that existed within the nation’s borders.
While feeling pride in one’s social identity is by no means wrong 
in itself, Social Identity theory expands upon the pitfalls that this 
strong association of the self with a particular group can present. 
The Categorization-Competition Hypothesis holds that merely cat-
egorizing oneself and the other into an ingroup and outgroup may 
generate intergroup competition (Hartstone & Augoustinos, 1995). 
This categorization of people into ingroups and outgroups results in 
an ingroup favoritism effect, in which people tend to favor and pro-
tect their own group’s interest against a perceived competitor group 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986). When extrapolated to a national scale, this 
effect may lead to an ingroup blaming the outgroup for a society’s 
problems, and the intimation that intergroup contact is undesirable 
(Jackson, 2002). Holding closely to one’s social identity may boost 
self-esteem, but this often comes at a cost to outgroup members.
However, research on social identity theory has determined that 
while people show favoritism towards ingroup members, this 
doesn’t necessarily translate to aggression or animosity towards 
outgroup members (Brewer, 1979, 1999; Mummendey & Wenzel, 
1999). In order for intergroup relations to escalate to the levels of 
violence and hatred observed in recent xenophobic attacks in South 
Africa, there must be other factors at play. 
JOB SCARCITY — A REALISTIC CONFLICT 
South Africa has been a hub for immigration since 1994. Its rela-
tively strong economy and largely stable political climate attract 
migrant workers from all over the continent. But despite its status as 
Africa’s largest economy (until surpassed by Nigeria in 20133), the 
nation has been experiencing high levels of unemployment, making 
job scarcity a frequent cause of concern and conflict. During the 
years following the end of apartheid, unemployment rose substan-
tially due to multiple economic and political factors including the 
repercussions of capital flight from the apartheid state, the legacy 
of the Bantu Education system, and the institution of labor market 
regulations that disadvantaged small enterprises (Nowak & Ricci, 
2006). This deficit of jobs exacerbated pre-existing intergroup com-
petition arguably latent in South African society, causing intergroup 
relations to move from ingroup favoritism to explicit outgroup hos-
tility.
In conjunction with Social Identity Theory, Realistic Conflict The-
ory can be used to explain the violent reaction towards migrant 
workers witnessed in the late 2000s. Realistic Conflict Theory pro-
poses that people attempt to maximize the rewards they accrue, 
even if this requires taking those rewards away from others (Taylor 
& Moghaddam, 1994). Consequently, people join groups in order 
to bolster their ability to claim rewards. This theory suggests that 
when different groups find themselves in pursuit of the same re-
sources, they end up competing— resulting in dislike and prejudice 
directed at members of the outgroup. 
In 2008, the year in which the first widespread outbreak of xeno-
phobia occurred, the national unemployment rate was 29%4. The 
belief that immigrants are ‘stealing jobs’ or ‘taking positions of 
power’ that would otherwise go to native citizens has since become 
salient rhetoric in xenophobic attacks and riots. As predicted by 
Realistic Conflict Theory, this scarcity of jobs fuels anti-immi-
grant sentiment; a 2010 survey by the Southern African Migration 
Program found that 60% of South Africans agree with the state-
3 “Nigeria Economy”. nigeria-consulate-frankfurt.de. Retrieved 12/10/2020.
4 https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/just-in-sa-unemployment-rate-jumps-
to-29-the-worst-since-2008-20190730/, retrieved on 10/16/2020
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ment that immigrants are “taking jobs,” whilst 55% think that they 
worsen crime, claims for which there is no evidence—studies have 
found that African immigrants are far likelier to be victims than 
perpetrators of criminal activity (Danso and McDonald 2001; Har-
ris 2001).5  But while only 14.68% of international migrants are 
unemployed ,(much lower than the national average), studies have 
shown that immigrant workers are more often responsible for job 
creation than job “theft,” as they often go into entrepreneurial busi-
ness roles and engage in the informal economy. According to a re-
cent World Bank study, self-employment accounts for 25% of total 
jobs among immigrants, compared to 16% for locals.6 
While Realistic Conflict Theory and competition over jobs certain-
ly play a role in the xenophobic attacks that have ravaged South 
Africa, this theory too is limited, as it fails to explain the historic 
deprivation and socio-economic realities experienced by the major-
ity of South Africans which predispose them to intolerance of for-
eigners (Tella, 2016). Before the democratic vote of 1994, 80-87% 
of the population was subjugated by the discriminatory laws of the 
apartheid state. A large portion of the population experienced ex-
treme poverty and were deprived of access to higher education and 
employment—as a consequence, South Africans take an unfavor-
able view of the employment of foreign workers who did not expe-
rience the dispossession of apartheid while native workers remain 
unemployed. However, migrant workers constitute a small fraction 
of South Africa’s population—7.2% according to a 2019 survey, 
and significantly less in 2008, when the riots began7. Immigration 
is clearly not responsible for South Africa’s 29% unemployment 
rate. This raises the question, are there other factors producing this 
large-scale reaction? 
THE FAILURE OF THE “RAINBOW NATION” AND THE MI-
GRANT SCAPEGOAT 
A theory which contextualizes the current intergroup conflict with-
in South Africa’s history of segregation, racism, nationalism, and 
exceptionalism is Glick’s Scapegoat Theory (Glick 2002; 2005). 
Scapegoat Theory is rooted in a perception of group ‘relative depri-
vation,’ the lack of resources necessary to continue the lifestyle, 
diet, and activities to which an individual or group has become ac-
customed (Runciman, 1966). This sense of deprivation is relative, 
as it emerges from a comparison to social norms that are not ab-
solute and generally differ depending on time and place. When a 
group perceives itself as relatively deprived, it searches for a cause 
of its deprivation, and in an attempt to maintain a positive social 
identity, an ingroup will often settle on an innocent outgroup as the 
cause of its problems.
The increase in unemployment rates following the end of apart-
heid, combined with an expectation held by many that democratic 
rule would lead to a vastly improved way of life, contributed to 
this sense of relative deprivation. Majority rule promised equality 
and opportunity for all South Africans—and yet, the majority of 
5 https://www.polity.org.za/article/unemployment-and-immigration-in-south-afri-
ca-2013-05-24 retrieved on 9/12/20
6 https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/empirical-evidence-shows-mi-
grants-in-south-africa-create-jobs 
7 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immigration_to_South_Africa retrieved on 9/12/20
black South Africans remain in poverty amidst growing unemploy-
ment. Given this reality of relative deprivation, as well as abject 
deprivation and poverty8, South Africans sought an outlet for their 
frustration, and foreign immigrants provided an easy target (Tella 
& Ogunnubi, 2014). There are countless examples of this phenom-
enon throughout history, from the blaming of Christians for Rome’s 
natural disasters to the blaming of the Jewish community for Ger-
many’s economic strife—and it is a phenomenon that frequently 
culminates in xenophobic violence. 
This serves to explain, in part, why animosity is directed towards 
other African migrant workers, while almost never towards Europe-
an immigrants. This sense of relative deprivation is most common-
ly experienced by the lower-income black majority, as the white 
minority, which retained significant generational wealth, has ex-
perienced little in the way of lifestyle change, nor did white South 
Africans have expectations of lifestyle improvement. According to 
a recent study9, 49.2% black South Africans are “crowded” into 
low paying elementary jobs such as domestic labor and plant/craft 
occupations, while white and Asian people are more likely to hold 
managerial and professional positions. This is due to numerous fac-
tors, including the apartheid regime’s introduction of the Bantu Ed-
ucation act in 1953, a segregational law with the aim of funneling 
the black majority into manual, blue-collar jobs. 
This lack of access to quality education, compounded by the failure 
of the democratically elected ANC to prioritize education or root 
out corruption in the Education Department10, left a large subsec-
tion of the black population vying for a small number of low-skill 
jobs. As white European immigrants typically do not compete for 
these jobs, they do not experience the force of xenophobic feeling 
that is directed towards African migrant workers, who often arrive 
in South Africa with a ‘blue-collar’ skillset. White European immi-
grants also generally possess the means and social power to reside 
in gated neighborhoods and avoid situations in which they may 
face violence, unlike Zimbabwean and Malawian immigrants who 
generally reside in poorer neighborhoods and are more vulnerable 
to discrimination. 
But why, one might ask, do South Africans not look inward to find 
the causes of economic strife and unemployment? One notion is 
8 While relative deprivation was clearly at play, there is also the force of basic 
poverty and the struggle to survive which fueled the frustration and violence of 
xenophobic attacks.
9 https://paa2008.princeton.edu/papers/80858 retrieved on 9/12/20
10 https://www.news24.com/news24/MyNews24/education-biggest-failure-of-the-
anc-government-the-past-25-years-20190626 Retrieved 12/10/2020
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that of South African exceptionalism; due to the post-1994 con-
struction of a hyper-positive social identity, South Africans view 
South Africa as the ‘richest’ and most ‘developed’ African nation. 
As a result, South Africans are motivated to overlook internal and 
historical issues in favor of blaming an outgroup. On this subject, 
social psychologist Tshitereke has suggested: 
“In the post-apartheid epoch, while people’s expectations have 
been heightened, a realization that delivery is not immediate has 
meant that discontent and indignation are at their peak. People 
are more conscious of their deprivation than ever before .... This 
is the ideal situation for a phenomenon like xenophobia to take 
root and flourish. South Africa’s political transition to democra-
cy has exposed the unequal distribution of resources and wealth 
in the country.” 
(Tshitereke,1999: 4) 
Though the most significant factors involved in South Africa’s high 
unemployment rates are the legacy of apartheid’s Bantu education, 
the failure of the education system, and long-standing economic 
and financial inequality, South Africans largely ignore these issues, 
and many have latched onto the idea that immigrants are the cause 
of the widespread job scarcity. This rhetoric preserves the positive 
social identity of the “Rainbow Nation’’ that emerged after apart-
heid ended in 1994. 
The ideological theory of scapegoating best explains the facts of the 
case in South Africa, as well as its historical context. This theory 
proposes that dominant groups take up an ideology in which scape-
goat populations can be blamed for the ingroup’s relative depri-
vation and concerns (Glick, 2002; 2005). This ideology may also 
serve to promote the ingroup’s positive social identity by providing 
an external group with which the ingroup can be positively con-
trasted. Glick suggests that there are various factors which make a 
subsection of the population vulnerable to being scapegoated: lack 
of power (which prevents effective resistance), visibility as an out-
group, and being stereotyped and disliked along axes that make it 
‘justifiable’ to blame them for the ingroup’s predicament. 
All three of these factors apply to the non-native community in 
South Africa. As non-citizens (who often lack documentation), 
immigrants have fewer rights and protections than native South 
Africans. Also, the absence of communal structures and authority 
make it difficult for immigrants to voice concerns over their treat-
ment. Although the majority of immigrants who have experienced 
violence are black Africans, and thus not always visibly distinct 
from black South Africans, various factors such as language, reli-
gion, and cultural practices mark them as distinctly ‘other.’ Mørris 
(1998) has observed that although the population of Nigerian and 
Congolese immigrants in South Africa is comparatively small, and 
that most are employed in the informal sector, they are nevertheless 
identifiable as foreigners because of their distinct physical appear-
ance, dress, and lack of fluency in South African languages. These 
groups are also frequently stereotyped and discriminated against 
in the media and by public figures in ways that make them more 
vulnerable to prejudice and large-scale dislike. 
SCAPEGOAT MYTHOLOGY
A key initiator of xenophobic uprisings in South Africa has been 
anti-foreigner rhetoric that conflated immigrants with criminality, 
as well as the use of dehumanizing terms to refer to non-nation-
als residing in the country. Migrant laborers have been labelled a 
‘human tsunami11,’ feeding into a general sentiment that foreign-
ers move into the country in order to ‘take all the South African 
jobs’. In the early 2000s, a derogatory term came into circulation 
to describe migrant foreigners: ‘makwerekwere,’ purportedly de-
rived from the phonetic sound of foreign African languages. Cru-
cially, the 2015 attacks followed a speech by Zulu King Goodwill 
Zwelithini, in which he said: 
“I would like to ask the South African government to help us. 
We must deal with our own lice in our heads. Let’s take out the 
ants and leave them in the sun. We ask that immigrants must take 
their bags and go where they come from.” 
(eNCA, 2015)
This comparison of the outgroup to “lice” and “ants” is a clear at-
tempt at dehumanization, in which the derogated others are com-
pared to parasitic life forms. This form of mythologizing of the out-
sider as a parasite and therefore a danger to the ingroup legitimizes 
violence, as it requires that the outgroup be punished or eradicated 
in order to protect the health, status, and well-being of the ingroup.
 
In South Africa, this discrimination was bolstered by misinforma-
tion at the highest level of government; the post-apartheid govern-
ment miss-quoted the number of undocumented immigrants at 9 
million when the actual number was closer to 500,00012,  prompting 
undue concern about the presence of immigrants with the nation’s 
borders. Again, in 1996, a government-sponsored study claimed 
that there were 2.5 - 4.1 million undocumented migrants in the 
country, despite the best statistical evidence suggesting that the real 
number was half that. Although the study was withdrawn due to 
widespread concerns about its methodology, it remains in the public 
consciousness and is frequently cited by government officials and 
news reporters. In this case, institutions like Witwatersrand Uni-
versity, which had the financial backing of the government, were 
leveraged to proliferate a myth (the idea that millions of migrants 
are flooding the country) that ‘legitimizes’ discriminatory behavior. 
Similarly, a prominent anti-crime program named Operation Fie-
la, whose goal was to root out ‘dangerous individuals,’ was imple-
mented in immigrant neighborhoods. Operation Fiela deported 700 
people while only charging 150 of them with any particular crime. 
This connection of criminality to non-citizen identity produced fur-
ther stereotyping and prejudice against immigrants, which served 
to bolster ideological scapegoating and xenophobic violence. South 
Africa’s previous president, Jacob Zuma, infamously claimed that 
those “legally” in the country must be protected, suggesting that 
undocumented immigrants did not warrant the protection of the 
state—a speech act which aggravated the violence already being 
11 https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2007/09/05/report-dismisses-hu-
man-tsunami-migrants-claim retrieved on 9/12/20
12 Crush, Jonathan; McDonald, David A. (September 2001). “Introduction to Spe-
cial Issue: Evaluating South African Immigration Policy after Apartheid”. Africa 
Today. 48 (3): 1–13. retrieved on 9/12/20
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inflicted on non-national communities. 
Finally, the media has played a prominent role in distilling this 
mythology of the “criminal” or “thieving” immigrant within South 
Africa. Derogatory labels such as “illegal immigrants,” “job steal-
ers,” “criminals,” and “drug traffickers” are common in the pages 
of South African newspapers, and South African media corpora-
tions have depicted particular nationalities as being associated with 
certain crimes, such as Nigerians with drug distribution and Con-
golese with passport fraud. In their paper “Writing Xenophobia: 
Immigration and the Print Media in Post-Apartheid South Africa” 
(2001), authors Danso and MacDonald write that:
“Highly sensationalized, Africanized and negative reporting of 
migration issues is generally in the form of superficial, statis-
tics-happy articles that do little to inform the reader about the 
complexities of migration or how it fits with broader social, po-
litical, and economic developments in the country/region.” 
In their review of depictions of foreign residents in the media, Dan-
so and Macdonald found that 24% of articles referencing non-na-
tionals used the word “aliens,” while 25% used sensational head-
lines such as “Illegals in SA add to decay of cities,” and 9% used 
sensational metaphors in the body of the text. The authors also note 
that none of the major newspapers have journalists dedicated to 
covering issues of immigration, which contributes to the oversim-
plification and ignorance propagated by media outlets. In combi-
nation, these practices by the media industry serve to cement and 
circulate the idea of non-natives as dangerous, pervasive, and in-
human, tropes which feed into the mythology of the criminal alien. 
THE FUTURE OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS IN SA
The current violence directed towards non-natives in South Africa 
can be understood as the product of the construction of an ‘excep-
tional’ South African social identity at the end of the apartheid re-
gime, in conjunction with the real conflict imposed by job scarcity. 
However, the fact that immigration is not a significant contributor 
to unemployment, in conjunction with the virulent, dehumanizing 
rhetoric circulated about immigrants, points to a further cause of 
the violence being explained via Ideological Scapegoat Theory and 
the positioning of non-natives as a ‘parasitic’ outgroup that is re-
sponsible for the poverty and lack of opportunity that persist de-
spite majority rule. 
One political avenue that offers hope for the future is that of stig-
ma-based solidarity (Craig & Richeson, 2016). While Social Iden-
tity Theory proposes that threats to social identity may provoke 
negative intergroup relations so as to bolster the ingroup’s esteem 
(Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999), as has so far been 
the case in South Africa, the promotion of a more coalitional and 
co-operative mindset may decrease this effect and instead empha-
size solidarity in the face of shared hardship. An emphasis of the 
difficulties faced by both migrant workers and lower-income black 
South Africans may promote this form of solidarity, as shared ex-
perience is associated with greater coalitional propensities among 
stigmatized groups (Cortland et al., 2015; Tedin & Murray, 1994). 
Important factors involved in whether or not groups will pursue 
coalition are perceived similarity and whether the stigmatization 
is occurring along the same identity dimension, such as race. In 
South Africa, black people are the racial majority and racial stigma 
is not explicitly at play in the high unemployment rates present in 
South Africa. However, there are nevertheless persistent racist atti-
tudes amongst white and Asian South Africans which are directed 
towards black people regardless of nationality, and both groups are 
impacted by the legacy of colonialization. Although the experience 
of unemployed or poverty-stricken black South Africans and the 
discrimination currently faced by non-native communities do not 
operate along the same axis, there are nevertheless the shared iden-
tities of race and socio-economic status, and the shared experiences 
of racism and historical inequality, which may serve as the basis for 
mutual understanding and support. 
While South Africa continues to experience xenophobia within its 
borders, the beginnings of this form of coalition-building are visi-
ble, and voices are being raised in protest of violent and exclusion-
ary attitudes. In 2015, 30,000 people took part in a march through 
Johannesburg in protest of a spate of xenophobia attacks13. They 
were led by the premier of Gauteng province, David Makhura, who 
told the crowd, “We will defeat xenophobia like we defeated apart-
heid.” Influential leaders such as Makhura may help to develop a 
new facet of South African identity: the idea that all black people 
within South African borders are united and depend upon one an-
other, especially in the current moment. While further media rep-
resentation, interrogation of our understanding of national identity, 
and education on prejudice and stereotypes are necessary to de-
crease the prevalence of xenophobia, this is a first gesture towards 
tackling xenophobic violence in South Africa.
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